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Introduction
Microfinance is widely recognized as a powerful method for poverty
alleviation. However, little is known about the characteristics of those
who default on their loans. This study investigates whether non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers reveal any difference in their
level of risk and time preference through an artefactual field
experiment. Understanding the behavior of borrowers is important to
mitigate default for microfinance lenders.
Hypothesis:
H0 = 0 There is no difference between the level of risk in non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers
HA ≠ 0 There is a difference between the level of risk in non-delinquent
and delinquent borrowers
H0 = 0 There is no difference between the level of patience in non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers
HA ≠ 0 There is a difference between the level of patience in non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers
Methodology:
To test my hypotheses, I carried out an artefactual field experiment 
among 97 microfinance borrowers of the National Microfinance Bank 
(NMB) of Jordan in June 2012. 
Borrowers were randomly chosen from a list of borrowers from NMB 
are identified in this sample as having a business loan that was less 
than or equal to 3500JD (≈ $4,948.31).
Table 1 — Summary Statistics of Sample by Type of Borrower
(Means, Standard Deviations, Min|Max)
Total Non-delinquent Delinquent T-Statistic
Age (years) 38.216 37.098 40.111
1.4278*(10.332) (9.342) (11.71)
20|62 20|58 20|62
Currently Employed .381 .393 .361
-0.3136(.488) (.492) (.487)
0|1 0|1 0|1
Education1 2.608 2.426 2.916
1.6429*
(1.432) (1.371) (1.5)
0|7 0|7 0|6
Loan Size 767.391 735.833 826.562
0.7374(560.682) (578.945) (528.537)
300|3500 300|3500 300|2200
HH Income 404.597 382.766 433.914
1.1657
(196.957) (180.439) (216.386)
150|1000 150|900 155|1000
Female .907 .934 .861
-1.1989(.291) (.249) (.350)
0|1 0|1 0|1
Sample Size 97 61 36
11=Primary, 2=Basic, 3=Secondary, 4=Some College, 5=A.A. Degree, 6=B.A/B.S. Degree, 7=Graduate school
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model
My Linear Probability Model, looking at the characteristics of risk, estimates:
P 𝑌𝑖 = 1 𝑋𝑖 = β
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X𝑖 + ε𝑖 (1)
𝑌𝑖 = 1 if an individual borrower i is a non-delinquent borrower and 0 if an
individual borrower i is a delinquent borrower
β
1
R𝑖 , the level of risk aversion captured from the experiment
β2IRi, a risk index variable
β3TIi, a trust index variable, and
β4Xi and 𝜀𝑖 , observed and unobserved factors, respectively
My Linear Probability Model, looking at the characteristics of time preference,
estimates:
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𝑌𝑖 = 1 if an individual borrower i is a non-delinquent borrower and 0 if an
individual borrower i is a delinquent borrower
β
1
𝑃𝑖
𝑠, a dummy variable for an individual who has a strong present-biased
β
2
𝑃𝑖
𝑤, a dummy variable indicating a weakly present-biased individual
β
3
FTI
𝑖
, a dummy variable representing an individual with future-biased time
inconsistency (dummy for time-consistent preferences is omitted)
β
4
R𝑖 , the level of risk aversion captured from the experiment
β5ITPi, a time preference index variable
β6Xi and 𝜀𝑖 , observed and unobserved factors, respectively.
Table — 2 Risk by Type of Borrower
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Risk Experiment 0.0427 0.0387 0.0588* 0.0590** 0.0558**
(0.0266) (0.0288) (0.0312) (0.0240) (0.0238)
Risk Index -0.281* -0.213** -0.201*
(0.150) (0.105) (0.102)
Trust Index -0.0956
(0.0813)
Constant 0.474*** -0.102 -0.541 0.319 0.223
(0.108) (0.948) (1.254) (0.845) (0.884)
Observations 97 82 73 73 71
R-squared 0.026 0.138 0.208 0.611 0.619
Notes: Type of borrower = 1 indicates a non-delinquent borrower. I control for female, age, age2, 
marital status, education, log household income, log loan size, currently employed, rural branch, 
Ramadan, researcher, and enumerator.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results
Table 3 — Time Preference by Type of Borrower
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Type of 
Borrower
Strong Present 
Bias 0.0990 0.0197
(0.110) (0.0863)
Weak Present Bias -0.0705 0.150
(0.129) (0.104)
Future Bias Time 
Inconsistency 0.242* 0.101
(0.125) (0.121)
Time Preference 
Index 0.0631 0.0839 0.0533
(0.153) (0.155) (0.149)
Constant -0.233 -0.0763 -0.114 0.390 0.256 0.387
(0.947) (0.957) (0.963) (0.824) (0.815) (0.815)
Observations 82 82 82 77 77 77
R2 0.127 0.121 0.145 0.576 0.590 0.580
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Notes: Type of borrower = 1 indicates a non-delinquent borrower. I control for risk aversion (risk 
experiment), observable characteristics (age, age2, gender, education, currently employed, rural 
branch, marital status, log income, log loan size), and controls for Ramadan, researcher, and 
enumerator.
Discussion
I reject both hypotheses and report that there is a difference in the level
of risk-aversion and time preferences between non-delinquent and
delinquent borrowers
The findings reveal that non-delinquent borrowers are more likely to
be risk-seeking individuals and are more impatient than delinquent
borrowers, contradicting current literature on risk-aversion and time
preference.
Further research should be conducted to see the effects of Ramadan on
individual’s time preference.
Implications
One of the shortcomings of this paper is the limited sample size of the
borrowers in addition to the uneven distribution of non-delinquent and
delinquent borrowers. It would be ideal to have a roughly 50/50 split of
non-delinquent and delinquent borrowers to provide a more equivalent
variance between the two groups.
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